Standard and Hyperfinite Unifications for All Physical Theories by Herrmann, Robert A.
ar
X
iv
:p
hy
sic
s/0
10
50
12
v1
2 
 [p
hy
sic
s.g
en
-p
h]
  7
 Se
p 2
01
0
Standard and Hyperfinite Unifications for Physical Theories
Robert A. Herrmann
Mathematics Department
U. S. Naval Academy
572C Holloway Rd.
Annapolis, MD 21402-5002
15 FEB 2001, last revision 25 APR 2010
Abstract: A set of physical theories is represented by a nonempty subset
{SVNj | j ∈ IN} of the lattice of consequence operators defined on a
language Λ. It is established that there exists a unifying injection S
defined on the nonempty set of significant representations for natural-
systems M ⊂ Λ. If W ∈ M, then SW is a hyperfinite ultralogic and⋃
{SVNj (W) | j ∈ IN} = SW(
∗W) ∩ Λ. A “product” hyperfinite
ultralogic Π is defined on internal subsets of the product set ∗Λm and
shown to represent the application of S to {W1, . . . ,Wm} ⊂ M. There
also exists a standard unifying injection SW such that SW(
∗W) ⊂
∗SW(
∗W).
1. Introduction.
For reader convince, some of the introductory remarks that appear in Herrmann
(2001a) are repeated. Seventy years ago, Tarski (1956, pp. 60-109) introduced con-
sequence operators as models for various aspects of human thought. Within lattice
theory, there are two such mathematical theories investigated, the general and the
finitary consequence operators (Herrmann, 1987). The finitary consequence oper-
ators are usually the operators that model human thought processes that use but
finite arguments and a finite collection of premises to arrive at a specific conclusion.
Let L be a nonempty language, P be the power set operator and F the finite power
set operator.
Definition 1.1. A mapping C:P(L)→ P(L) is a general consequence operator
(or closure operator) if for each X, Y ∈ P(L)
(1) X ⊂ C(X) = C(C(X)) ⊂ L; and if
(2) X ⊂ Y, then C(X) ⊂ C(Y).
A consequence operator C defined on L is said to be finitary (finite, or algebraic) if
it satisfies
(3) C(X) =
⋃
{C(A) | A ∈ F(X)}.
Remark 1.2. The above axioms (1), (2), (3) are not independent. Indeed,
(1), (3) imply (2). Hence, the finitary consequence operators defined on a specific
language form a subset of the general operators. The phrase “defined on L” means
formally defined on P(L).
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Natural-systems are named and defined by scientific disciplines. Each is an
arrangement of named physical objects that are so related or connected as to form
an identifiable unity. Except for the most basic, natural-systems always require the
existence of accepted natural laws or processes for, at least, two events to occur.
It is required that a natural-system either be constructed by application of natural
laws or processes from more fundamental physical objects (natural-systems); or that
the natural-system is altered in its development by such natural laws or processes,
in which case the original natural-system may be considered as a more fundamental
physical object.
Explicit statements for a natural law or process and the theories they yield
are human inventions that imitate, in the words of Ferris (1979, p. 152), intrinsic
natural laws or processes that govern the workings of those portions of our universe
that are comprehensible. Individuals apply various mental processes to a set of
hypotheses that include a set of natural laws or processes and predict behavior for
a natural-system. Mental processes are also applied to natural laws or processes
in order to construct our material “man made universe.” Consequence operators
model such mental behavior. Indeed, these operators model many general mental
processes not merely the standard notion termed as “deduction.”
2. Axiomatic consequence operators.
Prior to simplification, it is assumed that our consequence operators are ax-
iomatic, where the axioms include appropriate natural laws or processes. Also,
utilized is the fundamental philosophy of modern science notion that, with the
exception of the accepted and most fundamental of physical objects, all named
natural-systems are obtained by application of natural laws or processes to physical
objects that are defined as more fundamental in character than the natural-systems
of which they are constituents. Obviously, specified natural laws or processes alter
specific natural-system behavior. As mentioned, the results in this paper are not
restricted to what is usually termed as deduction. As done in Herrmann (1999, p.
12), only consider equivalent representatives as the members of L. (This is not the
same notion as consequence operator logical equivalence.) Let C(L) [resp. Cf(L)]
be the set of all general [resp. finitary] consequence operators defined on L, where
A ⊂ L is the set of logical axioms for F ∈ C(L) [resp. Cf(L)].
Although, usually, such consequence operators are considered as axiomatic, in
this application the use of axiomless operators (Herrmann 1987, p. 3) leads to a
significant simplification. For F ∈ C(L) [resp. Cf(L)], let A ∪ N ⊂ L and suppose
that F(∅) ⊃ A∪N. (Note: N does not denote the natural numbers). Then ∅ ⊂ A∪N
yields F(∅) ⊂ F(A ∪N), and A ∪ N ⊂ F(∅) yields that F(A ∪ N) ⊂ F(F(∅)) = F(∅).
Hence, F(∅) = F(A∪N). Further, note that if B ⊂ A∪N, then since ∅ ⊂ B, it follows
that F(∅) = F(A∪N) ⊂ F(B) ⊂ F(F(A∪N)) = F(A∪N) and F(B) = F(A∪N). The
objects in F(A∪N) behave as if they are axioms for F. Can this axiomatic behavior
be used to generate formally a specific consequence operator C, where C(∅) = ∅, and
the only results displayed by this model are conclusions not members of F(A∪N)?
If such a meaningful consequence operator exists, then this approach is acceptable
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since if natural laws or processes, as represented by N, are stated correctly, such as
always including any physical circumstances that might restrict their application,
then they behave like physical “tautologies” for our universe. For such a basic
consequence operator F, the set F(∅) is composed of all of the restatements of N
that are considered as “logically” equivalent, and all of the pure “logical” theorems.
In general, various forms of scientific argument are modeled by consequence
operators, where the use of axioms is a general process not dependent upon the
axioms used. The axioms are but inserted into an argument after which the actual
rules of inference are applied that might yield some x ∈ L− F(∅). It is this x that
may yield something not trivial. In the physical case, this x may represent some
aspect of an actual physical object distinct from the natural laws or processes.
3. Extended Rules that generate consequence operators.
In Herrmann (2001b), the unification presented is rather restrictive and does
not properly represent common practice. A major aspect of a theoretical scientific
construct is not usually included within the specific rules of inference for conse-
quence operator generation, but it is an exterior notion. This does not mean that
this aspect cannot be modeled by a consequence operator. However, in general,
the composition of consequence operators does not lead to a consequence operator
(Herrmann, 1987). This aspect is an extension of the realism relation. It is not ad-
joined to the axioms of a consequence operator but it is a basic notion within human
intelligence and is applied only after a consequence operator generates conclusions
from a set of premises. The definition that appears in the next section requires an
extension of the usual rules of inference, an extension that is used in practice.
The following two paragraphs define “logic-systems.” In this investigation, the
term “deduction” is broadly defined. Informally, the pre-axioms A ∪ N is a subset
of our language L, where N represents natural laws or processes, and there exists
a fixed finite set RI = {R1, . . . ,Rp} of n-ary relations (n ≥ 1) on L. The term
“fixed” means that no member of RI is altered by any set X of hypotheses that
are used as discussed below. It is possible, however, that some of these Ri are N
dependent. This means that various natural laws or processes can be incorporated
within some of the n-ary relations, where n > 1. It can be effectively decided when
an x ∈ L is a member of A ∪ N or a member of any of the fixed 1-ary relations.
Further, for any finite B ⊂ L and an (j + 1)-ary Ri ∈ RI, j ≥ 1 and any f ∈ Ri,
it is always assumed that it can be effectively decided whether the k-th coordinate
value f(k) ∈ B, k = 1, . . . , j. It is always assumed that a mental or equivalent
activity called deduction from a set of hypotheses can be represented by a finite
(partial) sequence of numbered (in order) steps b1, . . . , bm with the final step bm
the conclusion of the deduction. All of these steps are considered as represented
by objects from the language L. Any such representation is composed either of the
zero step, indicating that there are no steps in the representation, or one or more
steps with the last numbered step being some m > 0. In this inductive step-by-step
construction, a basic rule used to construct this representation is the insertion rule.
If the construction is at the step number m ≥ 0, then the insertion rule, I, is the
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“insertion of an hypothesis from X ⊂ L, or insertion of a member from the set A∪N,
or the insertion of any member from any 1-ary relation, and denoting this insertion
by the next step number.” If the construction is at the step number m > 0, then
the rules of inference, RI, are used to allow for an insertion of a member from L as
a step number m + 1, in the following manner. For any (j + 1)-ary Ri ∈ RI, 1 ≤ j,
and any f ∈ Ri, if f(k) ∈ {b1, . . . , bm}, k = 1, . . . , j, then f(j + 1) can be inserted
as a step number m+ 1. Note, in particular, how specific “choices” are an essential
part of the process here termed as deduction.
For this paper, note the possible existence of special binary relations J that
may be members of RI. These relations are identity styled relations in that the first
coordinate and second coordinates are identical. In scientific theory building, these
are used to indicate that a particular set of natural laws or processes does not alter
a particular premise that describes a natural-system characteristic. The statement
represented by this premise remains part of the final conclusion. Scientifically this
can be a significant fact. These J relations are significant for the extended realism
relation. The deduction is constructed only from the rule of insertion or the rules
of inference as described in this and the previous paragraph.
It is not difficult to show that if you apply these procedures to obtain the final
step as your deduction, then these procedures are modeled by a finitary consequence
operator. For the language L, a set of pre-axioms A ∪ N, a set RI and any X ⊂ L,
define the set map CN, by letting CN(X) be the set of all members of L that
can be obtained from X by “deduction.” Clearly, by insertion X ⊂ CN(X). Since
CN(X) ⊂ L, then consider the statement CN(CN(X)). Since no member of the set
RI is altered by introducing a different set of hypotheses such as CN(X), then this
composition is defined. Let x ∈ CN(CN(X)). By definition, x is the final step in a
finite list {bi} of members from L. The steps in this finite “deduction” from which
x ∈ L is obtained are the I steps, where added to these insertions are only members
from CN(X), while the RI steps, as defined above, are fixed.
Suppose that bi ∈ CN(X) is any of these additional insertions. Simply construct
a new finite sequence of steps by substituting for each such bi the finite sequence
of steps from which bi is the final step in deducing that bi ∈ CN(X). The resulting
finite collections of steps are then renumbered. The final step in this new finite
deduction is x. Since the reasons for all of the steps is either the original I or RI,
and RI contains predetermined n-ary relations that are not dependent upon any
deduction, then the finite sequence obtained in this manner is a deduction for a
member of CN(X). Hence, x ∈ CN(X). Consequently, CN(CN(X)) = CN(X). The
finitary requirement is obvious since there are only a finite number of steps in any
deduction. Note that CN(∅) ⊃ B, where B is the set of all non-hypothesis x ∈ L such
that x is a step obtained only by the rule I. Throughout the remainder of this paper,
it is assumed that all “deductions” follow these procedures and the corresponding
consequence operator is defined as above. [Note: There are other methods to define
theRI. This is especially the case for finite languages. Any description for deduction
that leads to an argument similar to the one presented above would, of course, verify
that the corresponding defined set map is a consequence operator.]
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4. Axiomatic intrinsic natural laws or processes.
For “scientific deduction” for a fixed science-community, i, consider as our
rules of inference a collection Ri = RI of all of the “rules of inference used by this
specific scientific-community and allowed by their scientific method” as they are
applied to a specified language Σi, the language for “their science.” At present, this
definition for Ri is rather vague. Hence, the existence of such a set Ri, the rules
of inference for a science-community, is an assumption. Of course, as Σi changes,
so might the Ri be altered. The Ri can also change for other valid reasons. From
this, a specific “science” consequence operator SNi is generated for each set of pre-
axioms Ai ∪ Ni, where Ai are the basic logical axioms and Ni the natural laws
or processes. For proper application, the science consequence operator is applied
to specific natural-systems, not those generally described. Thus SNi has physical
meaning only when SNi is applied to an X where every member of X and SNi(X)
is a “tagged” statement that identifies a specific natural-system (Herrmann, 1999).
In all that follows, a particular Ui ⊂ Σi of natural laws or processes is considered
as accepted by a science-community at this particular moment of time and they are
stated using the language Σi.
The axiomatic consequence operator SNi :P(Σi)→ P(Σi), where SNi(∅) ⊃ (Ai∪
Ni), can be reduced, formally, to an axiomless consequence operator on the language
Σi−SNi(Ai∪Ni) as shown by Tarski (1930, p. 67). In this paper, this single process
is termed relativization. Let V = {Ai,Ni.} For each X ⊂ Σi − SNi(Ai ∪ Ni), let
SVNi(X) = (Σi−SNi(Ai∪Ni))∩SNi(X). For this SNi , the operator S
V
Ni
is a consequence
operator on Σi − SNi(Ai ∪ Ni) and has the property that S
V
Ni
(∅) = ∅. Thus, using
SNi(Ai∪Ni) as a set of axioms, logical and physical, S
V
Ni
behaves as if it is axiomless,
where the explicit natural laws or processes Ni behave as if they are implicit. Since,
in general, SNi(Ai ∪ Ni) ⊂ SNi(X), the only consequences that are not but specific
deductions from the pre-axioms Ai∪Ni are members of SNi(X)−SNi(Ai∪Ni), where
the explicit X should not include members of SNi(Ai ∪ Ni). Physically, S
V
Ni
is the
exact operator that, using implicitly such axioms as SNi(Ai ∪Ni), characterizes the
coalescing of a given fundamental collection of named and tagged objects in X and
that creates a different natural-system or that alters natural-system behavior. The
use of axiomless consequence operators is an important simplification.
Applying the above to an entire family of science-communities, there is for
an arbitrary science-community, i, a nonempty sequentially represented collection
Vi = {Ai, {Nij | j ∈ IN}} such that for any Nij ∈ Vi, the set map S
Vi
Nij
defined for
each X ⊂ (Σi − (
⋃
{SNij(Ai ∪ Nj) | j ∈ IN})) = Λi by S
Vi
Nij
(X) = Λi ∩ SNij(X) is a
consequence operator defined on Λi. (The set IN is the natural numbers not including
0.) The family Vi may or may not be finite. In many cases, it is denumerably since
to apply SViNij to a specifically tagged description X certain parameters within the
appropriate set of natural laws or processes must be specified so as to correspond
to the specific X. Assume that the applicable set of natural laws or process {Nij}
is the range of a sequence. This will not affect the conclusions since this yields
that Vi can be finite or denumerable. Note that for some of the Nnm and some
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tagged X ⊂ Λi to which the Nnm either does not apply or does not alter, that
SVnNnm(X) = X. For logical consistency, it is significant if there exists some type of
unifying consequence operator that will unify the separate theories not only applied
by a specific science-community (i), but within all of science.
5. The extended realism relation
In previous investigations, the realism relation was defined for a given conse-
quence operator CN to be, for each collection of words X from our language L, the
set C(X)−X, which, using relativization, generates a consequence operator defined
on L−X. In actual practice, this is a poor general definition since it removes from the
conclusions those members of X that may simply not be altered by N and remain a
characteristic of the conclusion, while other natural-system characteristics may have
been altered. Under our new definition for the rules of inference this possibility can
be included. The steps in any “deduction” for a conclusions x ∈ CN(X) are finite
in number. Thus using the aspect of human intelligence called (finite) choice, it is
always effectively possible to determine whether a J type rule of inference is used
to obtain x, where x ∈ X. The extended realism relation is applied after application
of such an CN.
To obtain a possibly new set of premises for application of the appropriate
consequence operator, the extended realism relation is an operator that removes
from CN(X), through application finite human choice, those members of X that are
not obtained from the rules of inference. Let RCNX ⊂ L represent those members
so removed. Notice that by relativization to the set L − RCNX , CN(X) generates
a consequence operator now defined on P(L− RCNX ). If each member of a set of
consequence operators is being applied simultaneously, then the language for the
next application is the intersection of all of the individual L − RCNX . In this paper,
consequence operators are viewed as being applied to a specific and fixed subset of
P(L) at a particular moment, say in cosmic time. This extended realism relation, the
relativization process, is applied only after such an application, it is not considered
as part of the original requirements for the generating consequence operator and no
additional notation is applied that indicates the relativized operator is required for
the next application.
6. A hyperfinite unification for physical theories.
Although all that follows can be applied to arbitrary science-communities, for
notational convenience, consider but one science-community. Thus assume that
there is one language for science Σ and one sequentially represented countable family
of natural laws or processes and logical axioms Aj ∪ Nj as well as one family of
sequentially represented rules of inference Rj that generate each specific theory.
Let sequentially represented V = {Aj ∪ Nj | j ∈ IN}. This yields the sequentially
represented countable set of physical theories {SNi | j ∈ IN} and the countable set
{SVNj | j ∈ IN} of intrinsic sequentially represented consequence operators defined on
Σ − (
⋃
{SNj(Aj ∪ Nj) | j ∈ IN}) = Λ. The following theorem and corollary do not
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depend upon each member of {SNj | j ∈ IN} being declared as a “correct” physical
theory.
Our interest is in the non-trivial application of, at the least, one of these theories
to members of P(Λ).
Definition 6.1. A nonempty X ∈ P(Λ) is called a significant member of P(Λ)
if there exists some i ∈ IN such that X 6= SVNi(X). Let nonempty M ⊂ P(Λ) be the
set of all significant members of P(Λ).
Definition 6.2. Suppose you have a nonempty finite set C = {C1, . . . ,Cm} of
general consequence operators, each defined on a language Li, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Define
the operator ΠCm as follows: for any X ⊂ L1 × · · · × Lm, using the projection
pri, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, define ΠCm(X) = C1(pr1(X))× · · · × Cm(prm(X)).
(Note: For X ⊂ L1 × · · · × Lm, the usual definitions for the projection map
yields that if X 6= ∅, then for each i, pri(X) 6= ∅. The converse also holds. For the
case that X = ∅, since no Li is empty, choose for each projection the only function
that exists with empty domain and nonempty codomain, the empty function. Each
of these projections has an empty range (Dugundji, 1966, p. 11). )
Theorem 6.3. The operator ΠCm defined on the subsets of L1 × · · · × Lm is
a general consequence operator and if, at least, one member of C is axiomless, then
ΠCm is axiomless. If each member of C is finitary and axiomless, then ΠCm is
finitary.
Proof. (a) Let X ⊂ L1 × · · · × Lm. Then for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, pri(X) ⊂
Ci(pri(X)) ⊂ Li. But, X ⊂ pr1(X)×· · ·×prm(X) ⊂ C1(pr1(X))×· · ·×Cm(prm(X)) ⊂
L1 × · · · × Lm. Suppose that X 6= ∅. Then ∅ 6= ΠCm(X) = C1(pr1(X)) × · · · ×
Cm(prm(X)) ⊂ L1 × · · · × Lm. Hence, ∅ 6= pri(ΠCm(X)) = Ci(pri(X)), 1 ≤ i ≤ m
implies that Ci(pri(ΠCm(X))) = Ci(Ci(pri(X))) = Ci(pri(X)), 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Hence,
ΠCm(ΠCm(X)) = ΠCm(X). Let X = ∅ and no member of C is axiomless. Then
each pri(X) = ∅. But, each Ci(pri(X)) 6= ∅ implies that ΠCm(X) 6= ∅. By the
previous method, it follows, in this case, that ΠCm(ΠCm(X)) = ΠCm(X). Now
suppose that there is some j such that Cj is axiomless. Hence, Cj(prj(X)) = ∅
implies that ΠCm(X) = C1(pr1(X)) × · · · × Cm(prm(X)) = ∅, which implies that
Cj(prj(ΠCm(X))) = ∅. Consequently, C1(pr1(ΠCm(X)))×· · ·×Cm(prm(ΠCm(X))) =
∅. Thus, ΠCm(ΠCm(X)) = ∅ and axiom (1) holds. Also in the case where at least
one member of C is axiomless, then ΠCm is axiomless.
(b) Let X ⊂ Y ⊂ L1 × · · ·Lm. For each i, 1 ≤ 1 ≤ m, pri(X) ⊂ pri(Y), whether
pri(X) is the empty set or not the empty set. Hence, Ci(pri(X)) ⊂ Ci(pri(Y). There-
fore, ΠCm(X) = C1(pr1(X))×· · ·×Cm(prm(X)) ⊂ C1(pr1(Y))×· · ·×Cm(prm(Y)) =
ΠCm(Y) and axiom (2) holds. Thus, ΠCm is, at least, a general consequence oper-
ator.
(c) Assume that each member of C is finitary and axiomless and let x ∈ ΠCm(X)
where, since ΠCm is axiomless, X is nonempty. Then for each i, pri(x) ∈ Ci(pri(X)).
Since each Ci is finitary and axiomless, then there is some nonempty finite Fi ⊂
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pri(X) such that pri(x) ∈ Ci(Fi) ⊂ Ci(pri(X)). Hence, nonempty and finite F =
F1 × · · · × Fm ⊂ pr1(X) × · · · × prm(X). Then for each i, pri(F) = Fi implies that
finite F = F1×· · ·×Fm = pr1(F)×· · ·×prm(F) ⊂ pr1(X)×· · ·×prm(X). From axiom
(2), x ∈ ΠCm(F) = C1(pr1(F))×· · ·×Cm(prm(F)) ⊂ ΠCm(pr1(X)×· · ·×prm(X)) =
C1(pr1(X))× · · · × Cm(prm(X)) = ΠCm(X). This completes the proof.
In what follows, consider all of the previously defined notions but only with
respect to this informal V and the language Λ. (Although, the consequence op-
erators are being restricted to a special collection that is of interest to various
science-communities, Theorem 6.4 will hold, with obvious modifications, for any
sequentially represented set of consequence operators.) Although strictly not nec-
essary, in order for the following to correlate with the results in Herrmann (2001a),
embed all of these informal results into the formal superstructure M = 〈R,∈,=〉
as done in Herrmann (1993, p. 70) where R is isomorphic to the real numbers.
Further, consider the structure ∗M = 〈 ∗R,∈,=〉 a nonstandard and elementary
extension of M that is a 2|M|-saturated enlargement (| · | denotes cardinality). Fi-
nally, consider the superstructure Y , the Extended Grundlegend Structure. Note
that a structure based upon the natural numbers appears adequate for our analysis
since this investigation is only concerned with members of a denumerable language.
However, Y is used so that the results here can be directly related to those in
Herrmann (2001a). par
A unifying consequence operator approach seems at first to be rather obvi-
ous. In actual physical practice, a set of physical theories is applied to a spe-
cific W ⊂ Λ. The result is C(W) =
⋃
{SVNj(W) | j ∈ IN} and is most certainly
a unification for all of the physical science theories SNj . But, define the conse-
quence operator B on P({a, b, c, d, e}) by two relations {(a, b, c), (d, e)}. Then
B({a, b}) = {a, b, c} and B({d}) = {d, e}. Define R on P({a, b, c, d, e}) by one rela-
tion {(a, b, d)}. Hence, R({a, b}) = {a, b, d}. The union operation K is defined for
each X ∈ P({a, b, c, d, e}) by K(X) = B(X)∪R(X). However, K({a, b}) = {a, b, c, d}
and K(K({a, b})) = {a, b, c, d, e} and axiom (1) does not hold. The union opera-
tion, even in the simplest sense, is not determine a consequence operator. How can
this actual physical practice be considered as a rational process? This is done by
adjoining the choice aspect of intelligence to the process. Applying this additional
step, there is a standard consequence operator styled unification and more than one
ultralogic styled unification.
The following ultralogic styled unification is consistent with the modeling of
the ultralogic generation of probabilistic behavior (Herrmann, 1999, 2001a) and
minimal in the hyperfinite sense. In ultralogic theory, attempts are made to stay
within the bounds of the “finite” or “hyperfinite.” In all known cases, the set of
hypotheses selected from M is a finite set. For such selections of finite sets of signif-
icant hypotheses, the standard consequence operator P used to establish Theorem
6.4 is a finitary consequence operator. It is a practical consequence operator.
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Theorem 6.4. Given the language Λ and the sequentially represented set of
consequence operators {SVNj | j ∈ IN}.
(i) There exists an injection S on nonempty M, the set of all significant subsets
of Λ, into ∗(C(Λ)) such that for each W ∈ M, SW is a hyperfinite consequence
operator, an ultralogic, such that
⋃
{SVNj (W) | j ∈ IN} ⊂
⋃
{ ∗SVNj (
∗W) | j ∈ IN} =
⋃
{ ∗(SVNj (W)) | j ∈ IN} ⊂ SW(
∗W) and
⋃
{SVNj (W) | j ∈ IN} = SW(
∗W) ∩Λ.
(ii) If ∅ 6= {W1, . . . ,Wm} ⊂ M, then there exists a hyperfinite consequence
operator Π defined on internal subsets of the product set ∗Λm such that for each
i = 1, . . .m, SWi(
∗Wi) =
∗pri(Π(
∗W1 × · · · ×
∗Wm)). If each Wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
is finitary, then Π is hyperfinitary.
(iii) For each W, A ∈ M, if W ⊂ A then SW(
∗W) ⊂ SW(
∗A) ⊂ SA(
∗A).
Proof. (i) In Herrmann (1987, p. 4), special sets of consequence operators are
defined. For this application and for a given X ∈ M, the set is HX = {P(Y,X) |
Y ⊂ Λ}. Each of the consequence operators in HX is defined as follows: for each
Z ⊂ Λ, P(Y,X)(Z) = Y∪Z, if X ⊂ Z; and P(Y,X)(Z) = Z otherwise. It is shown in
Herrmann (1987) that P is a general consequence operator; if X is nonempty, then P
is axiomless; if X is finite, then P is finitary. Let ∅ 6= A ⊂ P(Λ). Suppose that X ⊂ Z.
Then P(∪A,X)(Z) = (∪A) ∪ Z =
⋃
{A ∪ Z | A ∈ A} =
⋃
{P(A,X)(Z) | A ∈ A}.
Now suppose that X 6⊂ Z. Then P(∪A,X)(Z) = Z =
⋃
{P(A,X)(Z) | A ∈ A} ∈ HX.
Thus HX is closed under the arbitrary union operation.
Consider the entire set of intrinsic consequence operators {SVNj | j ∈ IN}. Define
by induction, with respect to the sequentially represented {SVNi | j ∈ IN}, P1 =
P(SVN1(X),X), P2 = P(S
V
N1
(X)∪ SVN2(X),X), . . . ,Pn = P(S
V
N1
(X)∪ · · · ∪ SVNn(X),X).
From this definition, it follows that for any n ∈ IN the equation (*) Pn(X) =
SVN1(X) ∪ · · · ∪ S
V
Nn
(X) holds for each X ⊂ Λ. The Pn, therefore, unify the finite
partial sequences of {SVNj | j ∈ IN}. This restriction to but finite unions is the aspect
that allows for a type of minimal ultralogic to be generated.
All of the above is now embedded into M and then considered as embedded
into the superstructure Y . Since {SVNi} is sequentially represented, there is a fixed
sequence g such that g(i) = SVNi , g[IN] = {S
V
Nj
| j ∈ IN} and g(i)(X) = SVNi(X).
Hence for arbitrary X ⊂ Λ, utilizing g, the above inductive definition yields a
sequence fX: IN → HX such that fX(j) = Pj and fX(j)(X) = Pj(X) and, as
embedded into M, equation (*) holds.
Let X ⊂ Λ. Then the following sentence holds in M.
∀x∀i((x ∈ Λ) ∧ (i ∈ IN)→ (x ∈ fX(i)(X)↔
∃j((j ∈ IN) ∧ (1 ≤ j ≤ i) ∧ (x ∈ g(j)(X))))). (6.1)
By *-transfer, the sentence
∀x∀i((x ∈ ∗Λ) ∧ (i ∈ ∗IN)→ (x ∈ ∗(fX(i)(X))↔
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∃j((j ∈ ∗IN) ∧ (1 ≤ j ≤ i) ∧ (x ∈ ∗(g(j)(X)))))) (6.2)
holds in ∗M. Due to our method of embedding and identification, sentence (6.2)
can be re-expressed as
∀x∀i((x ∈ ∗Λ) ∧ (i ∈ ∗IN)→ (x ∈ ∗fX(i)(
∗X)↔
∃j((j ∈ ∗IN) ∧ (1 ≤ j ≤ i) ∧ (x ∈ ∗g(j)( ∗X))))) (6.3)
Next consider ∗fX:
∗
IN → ∗HX and any λ ∈
∗
IN − IN. Then hyperfinite ∗fX(λ) ∈
∗HX is a nonstandard consequence operator, an ultralogic, that is hyperfinite in the
sense that it hyperfinitely generates each of the ∗Pj and it satisfies statement (6.3).
Hence, arbitrary j ∈ IN and w ∈ ∗g(j)( ∗X) = ∗SVNj(
∗X) = ∗(SVNj(X)) ⊂
∗Λ imply
that w ∈ ∗fX(λ)(
∗X) since 1 ≤ j < λ. Observe that σ(SVNj(X)) ⊂
∗(SVNj(X)).
However, under our special method for embedding σ(SVNj(X)) = S
V
Nj
(X), for an
arbitrary X ⊂ Λ.
The final step is to vary the X ∈ M. It is first shown that for two distinct
X, Y ∈ M there is an m ∈ IN such that PXm = P(S
V
N1
(X) ∪ · · · ∪ SVNm(X),X) 6=
PYm = P(S
V
N1
(Y)∪· · ·∪SVNm(Y),Y). Since X, Y are nonempty, distinct and arbitrary,
assume that X 6⊂ Y. Hence there is some i ∈ IN and j ∈ IN such that X ⊂ SVNi(X) 6= X
and Y ⊂ SVNj(Y) 6= Y. Consider some m ∈ IN such that i, j ≤ m. Let Y ⊂ X. Then
PXm(X) = P(S
V
N1
(X) ∪ · · · ∪ SVNm(X),X)(X) = S
V
N1
(X) ∪ · · · ∪ SVNm(X) 6= X ⊂ P
X
m(X).
But PYm(X) = X ⊂ P
X
m(X) 6= X. Thus P
Y
m(X) 6= P
X
m(X). Now further suppose
that Y 6⊂ X. Then there is some y ∈ Y such that {y} 6⊂ X. Since X ⊂ X ∪ {y}
and Y 6⊂ X ∪ {y}, then PXm(X ∪ {y}) = (S
V
N1
(X) ∪ · · · ∪ SVNm(X)) ∪ {y}. Since
Y 6⊂ X ∪ {y}, then PYm(X ∪ {y}) = X ∪ {y}. Again since S
V
N1
(X) ∪ · · · ∪ SVNm(X) 6=
X, then PYm(X ∪ {y}) 6= P
X
m(X ∪ {y}). In like manner, if Y 6⊂ X. Consequently,
PYm 6= P
X
m. Further, for any (†) k ∈ IN, m ≤ k, P
Y
k 6= P
X
k . Consider these results
formally stated. Then by *-transfer, for each distinct pair X, Y ∈M there exists
some m ∈ ∗IN such that ∗fX(m) 6=
∗fY(m). Thus for X, Y ∈ M, X 6= Y,
A(X,Y) = {m | (m ∈ ∗IN) ∧ ∗fX(m) 6=
∗fY(m)} is nonempty. The Axiom of
Choice for the general set theory (Herrmann, 1993, p. 2) used to construct our Y is
now applied. Hence, there exists a set B, within our structure, containing one and
only member from each A(X,Y).
The internal binary relation {(x, y) | (x ∈ ∗IN) ∧ (y ∈ ∗IN) ∧ (x ≤ y)} is, from
*-transfer of IN properties, a concurrent relation with respect to the range ∗IN. Since
∗M is a 2|M|-saturated enlargement and |B| < 2|M|, there is some λ ∈ ∗IN such
that for each i ∈ B, i ≤ λ. Considering this λ as fixed, then by *-transfer of (†),
it follows that for any distinct X, Y ∈ M ∗fX(λ) 6=
∗fY(λ). Since M is injectively
mapped onto M, there exists an injection S on the set M such that each W ∈ M,
SW =
∗fW(λ) ∈
∗(C(Λ)). Considering the general properties for such an ∗fW(λ)
as discussed above, it follows that
⋃
{SVNj (W) | j ∈ IN} ⊂ SW(
∗W) ∩Λ.
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Now assume that standard a ∈ SW(
∗W) −
⋃
{SVNj (W) | j ∈ IN}. (For our
identification and embedding, ∗a = a.) Then the following sentence
∀x∀i((x ∈ Λ) ∧ (i ∈ IN) ∧ x ∈ g(i)(W)→ x 6= a) (6.4)
holds in M and, hence,
∀x∀i((x ∈ ∗Λ) ∧ (i ∈ ∗IN) ∧ x ∈ ∗g(i)( ∗W)→ x 6= a) (6.5)
holds in ∗M. But since a ∈ ∗fW(λ)(
∗W), then statement (6.5) contradicts
statement (6.3) and this completes the proof of (i).
(ii) Note that for each W ∈ M, ∗fW(λ) is axiomless by *-transfer since
every member of ∗HW is axiomless. Consider nonempty {W1, . . . ,Wm} ⊂ M.
Use definition 6.2 and define Π on the internal X ∈ ∗(P(Λm)) = ∗P( ∗Λm) by
Π(X) = ∗fW1(λ)(
∗pr1(X)) × · · · ×
∗fWm(λ)(
∗prm(X)). It is easily seen by *-
transfer of Theorem 6.2 that Π is a hyperfinite ultralogic. Or, more directly, notice
that the properties of the projection maps ∗pri on internal sets are the same as the
standard projection maps. Since each member of ∗HWi satisfies the *-transfer of
axioms (1) and (2) on internal sets, then for ∗fWi(λ) this leads to the exact same (a)
(b) proofs as for Theorem 6.3. Since the finite Cartesian product of hyperfinite ob-
jects is hyperfinite, then Π is hyperfinite. Therefore, Π is a hyperfinite ultralogic and
for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, ∗pri(Π(
∗W1×· · ·×
∗Wm)) =
∗fWi(λ)(
∗Wi) = SWi(
∗Wi).
Finally, if each Wi is finite, then each
∗fWi(λ) satisfies the *-transfer of axiom (3).
This means that in the place of the “finite” sets, hyperfinite sets are utilized. Again,
since the finite Cartesian product of hyperfinite sets is hyperfinite, then Π is hyper-
finitary.
(iii) For each j ∈ IN, W, A ∈ M, where W ⊂ A, it follows that PWj (W) ⊂
PWj (A) = S
V
Ni
(W) ∪ · · · ∪ SVNj(W) ∪ A. But, P
A
j (A) = S
V
N1
(A) ∪ · · · ∪ SVNj(A) ∪ A =
SVN1(A)∪· · ·∪S
V
Nj
(A). Since for each i ∈ IN, SVNi(W) ⊂ S
V
Ni
(A), then PWj (A) ⊂ P
A
j (A).
Thus, after embedding, fW(j)(W) ⊂ fW(j)(A) ⊂ fA(j)(A). By *-transfer, this
yields that SW(
∗W) = ∗fW(λ)(
∗W) ⊂ SW(
∗A) = ∗fW(j)(
∗A) ⊂ SA(
∗A) =
∗fA(j)(
∗A). This completes the proof.
Corollary 6.5. If {SVNj | j ∈ IN} represents all of the physical theories that
describe natural world behavior, then the choice function and the last equation in
part (i) of Theorem 6.4 and part (ii) correspond to an ultralogic unification for
{SVNj | j ∈ IN}.
Remark 6.6 Obviously, the results of Theorem 6.4 (i), (iii) and Corollary 6.5
(i) do not require that the standard theory consequence operators be axiomless.
Further, in proofs such as that of Theorem 6.4, some of the results can be obtained
without restricting the construction to members of HX. Simply define, for X ⊂
Λ, P′n(X) = S
V
N1
(X) ∪ · · · ∪ SVNn(X). One obtains a hyperfinite
∗hW(λ) from this
definition. The use of the HX objects is to further identify
∗fW(λ) as an ultralogic
that is also hyperfinite and of the type used in Herrmann (1999, 2001a) and, hence,
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allows for the modeling of certain aspects of intelligence. In general, a basic aspect
of intelligence is to select a specific member of M to which to apply a specific physical
theory while rejecting other members of M as so applicable. Due to the construction
of physical theory consequence operators with the extended realism relation, this
special aspect of intelligence is not usually modeled. But, this additional aspect of
intelligence is modeled by the choice procedures in the proof of Theorem 6.4 and
the specific selection of a member of HX.
Note that usually W is a finite set. Assuming this case, then again due to our
method of embedding ∗W = W. In statement (3), ∗g(i) = ∗SVNi . However, S
V
Ni
has had removed all of the steps that usually yield an infinite collection of results
when SNi is applied to W. Thus, in most cases, SNi(W) is a finite set. Hence,
assuming these second finite case, it follows that SVNj(W) =
∗(SVNj(W)). However,
each SW remains a nonstandard ultralogic since each SW is defined on the family of
all internal subsets of ∗Λ and the combined collection of all of the scientific theories
implies that Λ is denumerable. Of significance is that corollary 6.5 is technically
falsifiable. The most likely falsifying entity would be the acceptance of a physical
theory that does not use the rules of inference as setout in section 3. In particular,
when different hypotheses are considered, the requirement that the rules of inference
RI cannot be altered.
Such operators as SW can be interpreted in distinct ways. If they are inter-
preted in a physical-like sense, then they operate in a region called the nonstandard
physical world (Herrmann, 1989), where W corresponds physically to the natural-
system it describes. The restriction SW(
∗W) ∩Λ then represents a natural world
entity. As a second interpretation, S would represent an intrinsic process that ap-
pears to guide the development of our universe and tends to verify the Louis de
Broglie statement. “[T]he structure of the material universe has something in com-
mon with the laws that govern the workings of the human mind” (March, 1963, p.
143).
7. A standard consequence operator unification.
In practical science, each SVNj is applied to a finite X ⊂ Λ. In Herrmann(2001b),
Theorem 5.1 is the same as Theorem 6.4 part (i) in this paper. There is a major
difference, however, in how the results are obtained. In Theorem 6.4, a considerably
different standard consequence operator P is used. Since, in general, the union oper-
ation does not generate a consequence operator, any unifying consequence operator
standard or nonstandard would have additional characteristics. These characteris-
tics considered from the physical theory viewpoint might be rather undesirable. For
example, the standard consequence operator CXm used in Theorem 5.1 (Herrmann,
2001b) when applied at any nonempty Y ⊂ X, where Y,X ∈ M, has the property
that CXm(Y) = C
X
m(X) = S
V
N1
(X)∪, · · · ,∪SVNm(X). Although the choice function does
not allow an application to objects distinct from X, the fact that CXm satisfies the
consequence operator axioms does require such an application. Can such necessary
secondary requirements be ignored based upon practical physical usage? From the
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standpoint of such notions as cosmic time, the answer is yes. What actually is as-
sumed to occur is that such an unification is applied throughout the entire universe
at each moment in cosmic time.
The example given in section 6 that the union operation does not yield a
consequence operator shows that the idempotent property fails. Although it is not
a necessary requirement for the next result, under the assumption that all scientific
theories must be consistent in combined form, then a practical union operation
should share the same rationality as the individual SVN operators.
Theorem 7.1. Define for each X ∈ P(Λ), the operator PX∞ = P(
⋃
{SVNj(X) |
j ∈ IN},X) ∈ HX.
(i) There is an injection S on M such that for each Z ∈ M, SZ = P
Z
∞.
(ii) For eachW ∈ M, and SW(W), the set SW(A), A 6= W, A ∈ M, is consistent
with the alterations in natural-system behavior modeled by SW(W). Further, if
W ⊂ A, then SW(W) ⊂ SW(A) ⊂ SA(A).
(iii) If ∅ 6= {W1, . . . ,Wm} ⊂ M, then there exists a consequence operator Π
defined on P(Λm) such that for each i = 1, . . .m, SWi(Wi) = pri(Π(W1×· · ·×Wm)).
If each Wi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is finite, then Π is finitary.
(iv) For each W ∈ M, SW(
∗W) ⊂ ∗SW(
∗W).
Proof. (i) The proof in Theorem 6.4 that shows that for distinct W, Y ∈ M
PWm 6= P
Y
m also holds for P
W
∞ and P
Y
∞. Hence, simply defined a map S on M by
SW = P
W
∞. This map is an injection.
(ii) If W ∈ M, then PW∞(W) =
⋃
{SVNj(W) | j ∈ IN} follows from the definition
of the P consequence operator. Now assume that A ∈ M, W 6= A. First, let
W ⊂ A. Thus W represents a subsystem of the natural-system A that is distinct
from A. Then PW∞(W)(A) =
⋃
{SVNj(W) | j ∈ IN} ∪ A. It is the adjoined A that
allows for the idempotent portion of axiom (1). Is this adjoined A of any physical
concern? Since W ⊂ A is a very general statement without any other characterizing
requirements, it is not known whether A ⊂
⋃
{SVNj(W) | j ∈ IN}. Thus the results
can be interpreted as stating that when PW∞ is applied to a subsystem W ⊂ A the
result contains those members A that are not altered by any of the SVNj applied to
W. Of course, one my also assume that at the same instant PA∞ is applied to A.
This yields that PW∞(W) ⊂ P
A
∞(A) which is exactly as one would expect. In the
case that W 6⊂ A, then PW∞(A) = A. This is consistent with the lack of a specific
characterizing sharing relation between the W and A natural-systems. Of course,
PA∞(P
W
∞(A)) = P
A
∞(A) =
⋃
{SVNj(A) | j ∈ IN}. Thus neither of these results appears
to have any significance physical inconsistencies. The statement that if W ⊂ A,
then SW(W) ⊂ SW(A) ⊂ SA(A) is established in the same manner as part (iii) of
Theorem 6.4.
(iii) Theorem 6.3.
(iv) From Theorem 6.4, for each W ∈ M, SW(
∗W) = ∗fW(λ)(
∗W). From
13
the definition of the sequence f the following
∀i∀x((x ∈ Λ) ∧ (i ∈ IN) ∧ (x ∈ fW(i)(W))→ x ∈ SW(W)) (7.1)
holds in M. Hence, by *-transfer
∀i∀x((x ∈ ∗Λ) ∧ (i ∈ ∗IN) ∧ (x ∈ ∗fW(i)(
∗W))→ x ∈ ∗SW(
∗W)). (7.2)
However, letting i = λ and noting that ∗fW(λ)(
∗W) = SW(
∗W), then this
completes the proof.
Remark 7.2. Expressions such as (6.4) and (7.1) are equivalent to expressions
written in the required “bounded” formalism since the standard superstructure is
closed under basic set-theoretic operations. Further, from *-transfer, the basic
results in Theorem 7.1 part (ii) also hold for ∗SW(
∗W) and ∗SA(
∗A) as well as
internal arguments in general.
8. Probability models.
In Herrmann (1999, 2001a), it is shown that given a specific probability theory
for a specific source or natural-system described by a single sentence {G} that
predicts that an event E will occur with probability p then there is an ultralogic
Pp that generates an exact sequence of such events the relative frequency of which
will converge to p. It is also shown that the patterns produced by the frequency
functions for statistical distributions that model natural-system behavior are also
the results of applications of ultralogics. Although the main results in these papers
state as part of the hypothesis that p is theory predicted, the results also hold
if p or the distribution is obtained from but empirical evidence. Theorem 2.1 in
Herrmann (2001a) actually corresponds to Theorem 6.4. Notice that in Theorem
2.1 in Herrmann (2001a), that singleton type sets {G} are the only sets to which
the basic consequence operator is applied. Thus, throughout Theorem 2.1 you can
substitute for the C operator, the operator P and the same results are obtained.
Are these results for probability models consistent with Theorem 6.4? If prob-
ability models predict natural-system behavior, in any manner, then, in general, the
natural laws or processes N that are assumed to lead to such behavior only include
a statement that claims that the event sequences or distributions appear in the
natural world to be “randomly” generated. It is precisely the results in Herrmann
(1999, 2001a) that show that in the nonstandard physical world such behavior need
not be randomly obtained but can be specifically generated by ultralogics. These
results are thus consistent since the ultralogics obtained from Theorem 2 neither
correspond to nor apply to any nonstandard extension of the notion of standard
“randomness.”
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